Modern Economical Thinkers:
Joseph Stiglitz
Joseph Stiglitz (1943 - ) [9] is an American economist who is today one of the most
influential writers in development economics. Stiglitz early work was on
economics theory and macroeconomics. He wrote on the economics of information,
the imperfection of markets, how markets allocate risk, or fail to allocate risk
correctly. For this work he won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001.
Stiglitz most famous research was on screening, a technique used by one economic
agent to extract otherwise private information from another. It was for this
contribution to the theory of information asymmetry that he shared the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economics in 2001 "for laying the foundations for the theory of
markets with asymmetric information". Neoclassical economics literature assumed
that markets are efficient except for some limited and well-defined market failures.
Stiglitz has shown that “whenever markets are incomplete and/or information is
imperfect. The "optimal" range of government recommendable interventions is
definitely much larger than the traditional "market failure" school recognizes. For
Stiglitz, there is no such thing as an invisible hand, in the sense that free markets
lead to efficiency as if guided by unseen forces.
“The real debate today is about finding the right balance between the market and
government. Both are needed. They can each complement each other. This balance
will differ from time to time and place to place. The theories that I (and others)
helped develop explained why unfettered markets often not only do not lead to
social justice, but do not even produce efficient outcomes. Interestingly, there has
been no intellectual challenge to the refutation of Adam Smith's invisible hand: individuals and firms, in the pursuit of their self-interest, are not necessarily, or in
general, led as if by an invisible hand, to economic efficiency”.
Stiglitz also did research on efficiency wages, and helped create what became
known as the "Shapiro-Stiglitz model" to explain why there is unemployment even
in equilibrium, why wages are not bid down sufficiently by job seekers (in the
absence of minimum wages) so that everyone who wants a job finds one, and to
question whether the neoclassical paradigm could explain involuntary
unemployment. If employment levels are to be maintained, through a sufficient
lowering of wages, workers will be less productive than before through the shirking
effect. As a consequence, in the model, wages do not fall enough to maintain
employment levels at the previous state, because firms want to avoid excessive
shirking by their workers. So, unemployment must rise during recessions, because
wages are kept 'too high'. By creating hypercompetitive labour markets, all firms
(the winners when labourers compete) experience an increase in value.
His career took a shift in the late 1990s, when for 3 years he served as chief
economist for the World Bank. From that time on his attention turned to
development economics and he has written a large array of popular works, putting
forward a definite view of economic development.
He has put forward the idea that the global rules of the economic gains are
systematically unfair to poorer countries, more specifically he has argued that the
richer nations impose a regime of intellectual property rights on the poorer nations
which is too strict for the interest of poorer nations. This would mean a too strict
enforcement of pharmaceutical patterns, and Stiglitz believes that this intellectual
property rights should be looser, which would mean lower prices for
pharmaceuticals for the poorer nations. Stiglitz believes in trade reduction, but he
also thinks we should allow for differential tariffs and trade agreements. The
Wealth Nations should lower their tariffs unilaterally and not exist on reciprocity
from the poorer nations.
Stiglitz has also raised the prospect of unilateral debt relief for the poorer nations
and he has argued there is a systematic democracy deficit in international and
multilateral institutions. For instance, he has argued for giving poorer nations a
greater shares of voting rights in the IMF and World Bank. Taking together all of
these attempts would try shift the current global rules and move them closer to an arrangement which suits the interests of poorer nations, or so Stiglitz has argued.
He is best-known for his critique of the IMF. The IMF is well for its insistence on
economic policy reforms and lends money to the poorer nations of the world.
Stiglitz has argued that the IMF goes too far or imposes conditions on these nations
which are not appropriate. In particular Stiglitz has opposed the continual use of the
IMF advocating: a. Financial Market Liberalization b. Insistence on Debt
Repayment c. Fiscal Austerity and cuts in government spending d. Privatization of
developing country assets.
He is associated with the political left. He is seen as an advocate of the interests of
developing nations, but not all economists have agreed with his ideas. In general,
the notion of giving developing nations a greater say in the international economic
order does have a possible problem: developing nations are not as well run as the
wealthier nations. Giving developing nations a greater say in the world economic
order, may not make that order more efficient or more just.
I am a great fan of Joseph Stiglitz. He has been one of the first to comment on the
Euro Crisis, predicting it was heading towards Doomsday due to austerity measures
dictated from Berlin. He also investigated the case of the Argentinian recovery after
2001, which some people argue could be a good solution for Greece. He is right in the fact that pressure on austerity and debt handling from the IMF has led to
disastrous results. However, it is my opinion economic formulas don’t contemplate
cultural issues or country specifics. I will be retaking his concepts and discussing
these issues and more in later chapters.
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